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Redeeming a Lost Generation: “The Year of Law School 
Litigation” and the Future of the Law School Transparency 
Movement 
ANDREW S. MURPHY* 
What we have here is [a] powder keg, and if law schools don’t solve 
this problem, there will be a day when . . . some plaintiff’s lawyer[] 
shows up and says, “This looks like illegal deception.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
For years, law professors,2 journalists,3 bloggers,4 and even the American Bar 
Association (ABA)5 have warned prospective law students about the declining 
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 1. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BU1 
[hereinafter Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?] (quoting Professor William Henderson). 
Professor Henderson’s prediction appeared in the first of several much-discussed articles by 
Segal about the state of American legal education. See, e.g., David Segal, Behind the Curve, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU1 [hereinafter Segal, Behind the Curve]; David Segal, Law 
School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU1 [hereinafter Segal, Law 
School Economics]; David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1. Segal’s articles have been well received by many with an 
interest in American legal education, but some believe the articles exaggerate the problems 
facing American law schools today. See, e.g., David Lat, Law School Accreditation: What Is 
To Be Done?, ABOVE THE L. (Nov. 13, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/
11/law-school-accreditation-what-is-to-be-done/ (indicating that Dean David Yellen of the 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law “referred to the hard-hitting articles written by 
David Segal for the New York Times, which cast some law schools in a bad light, as 
‘despicable’ and lacking in nuance”). 
 2. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 136−44 (2012); Richard A. 
Matasar, The Rise and Fall of American Legal Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 496 
(2004) (“The golden era of American legal education is drawing to a close. Loans will be 
more closely monitored. Family resources will be tested. Fewer opportunities will be 
available. Salaries will be depressed. Greater numbers of graduates will compete for fewer 
slots in the market.”); Herwig Schlunk, Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be . . . 
Lawyers 10–14 (Vand. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-29, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497044 (arguing that, due to 
opportunity cost, going to law school can be a poor economic investment even for some 
students who do well at elite law schools); Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, The 
New Math of Legal Education, YOUNG LAW., July 2008, at 1 (“The current trends in tuition 
and starting salaries at large firms are unsustainable in the long term. In the short term, these 
trends are leaving more and more law school graduates worse off economically than if they 
had never attended law school.”). But see, e.g., Cynthia E. Nance, The Value of a Law 
Degree, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1629 (2011) (arguing that the relative affordability of public law 
schools makes a law degree from such an institution a good value). 
 3. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Going to Law School? Proceed With Caution, NAT’L L.J. 
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202436393903&sl
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value proposition of attending law school in the United States. However, until 
relatively recently, those admonitions seemed to fall mostly on deaf ears. Even as 
law school tuition grew more expensive6 and legal employment became harder to 
find,7 students continued to flock to law schools in ever-increasing numbers.8 
Indeed, because “[l]aw school has traditionally been thought of as a safe harbor in a 
poor economy,”9 applications to law schools actually increased during the recent 
recession,10 even as the nation’s largest law firms shed almost 10,000 attorney 
positions.11 
                                                                                                                 
return=20120823114029 (“[T]he rising cost of legal education and the dearth of jobs 
available to new graduates is prompting more people to urge prospective law students to 
think twice before they write their first tuition check.”). 
 4. See Lucille A. Jewel, You’re Doing it Wrong: How the Anti-Law School Scam 
Blogging Movement Can Shape the Legal Profession, 12 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. 239, 263–
64 (2011) (“The law school scam blogging movement is a community of mostly lower-tier 
law school graduates who . . . argue that law schools ‘scammed’ them into borrowing 
excessive sums of money to attend law school by painting . . . a picture that does not 
accurately reflect the placement and salary statistics for a school’s graduates.”). 
 5. See ABA COMM’N ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECON. CRISES ON THE PROFESSION AND 
LEGAL NEEDS, THE VALUE PROPOSITION OF ATTENDING LAW SCHOOL 1 (2009) (“Far too 
many law students expect that earning a law degree will solve their financial problems for 
life. In reality, however, attending law school can become a financial burden for law students 
who fail to consider carefully the financial implications of their decision.”). 
 6. See ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Law School Tuition 
1985–2011, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf. During 
the last three decades, the cost of law school tuition at both public and private law schools 
has gone up at between double and triple the general rate of inflation. Maimon 
Schwarzschild, The Ethics and Economics of American Legal Education Today, 17 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 5 (2008). However, more than half of all students receive some 
form of discount on the published tuition price. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. 
Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long Will It Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Bills?, 
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2012, 6:20AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
the_law_school_bubble_how_long_will_it_last_if_law_grads_cant_pay_bills/. 
 7. For example, across the country, there were about twice as many people who passed 
the bar in 2009 as there were job openings for lawyers. Catherine Rampell, The Lawyer 
Surplus, State by State, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (June 27, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/the-lawyer-surplus-state-by-state/?partner=rss&
emc=rss. 
 8. See ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Enrollment and Degrees 
Awarded 1963–2011, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_a
warded.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 9. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 136. 
 10. See LSAC Volume Summary, LSAC.ORG, http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/
Data/LSAC-volume-summary.asp. However, the correlation between rising unemployment 
and rising law school applications was much weaker during this recession than in previous 
ones. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 160−61. 
 11. David Brown, The NLJ 250: Editor’s Note, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 25, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202546887393. The Great Recession 
clearly had a very negative effect on the legal employment market, but the legal profession 
has also undergone a “paradigm shift,” which means that although current law students can 
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Recently, law school graduates have faced the worst entry-level legal 
employment market in half a century,12 and while many of these graduates have 
nevertheless managed to secure good positions, others have not been so fortunate. 
For thousands of unemployed and underemployed recent law school graduates—
especially those who had to borrow heavily to pay for law school—the decision to 
attend law school has proved financially disastrous.13 Many in this “Lost 
Generation” of law students may never enjoy the opportunity to practice law in a 
meaningful way, much less obtain any significant return on the time and (usually 
borrowed) money they invested in their legal education.14  
Given the vast discrepancy between the employment prospects these students 
anticipated and the employment opportunities they actually enjoy, many feel that 
their law schools misled them about the economic value of the education those 
schools provide.15 Believing their alma maters have caused them legally cognizable 
injuries, alumni of at least fifteen law schools have even filed purported class-
action lawsuits seeking tens of millions of dollars in damages for those alleged 
injuries.16 Although the true significance of these lawsuits cannot be fully 
appreciated at this time, the lawsuits have already contributed to the goals of the 
law school transparency movement, and those with an interest in legal education 
will certainly follow the lawsuits with great interest. This Note will explore the 
impact of this new type of class-action litigation by focusing primarily on three 
lawsuits that were filed in 2011—Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson School of Law,17 
Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law School,18 and MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley 
Law School.19 Specifically, this Note argues that class-action lawsuits against 
individual law schools might usefully supplement other potential methods for 
persuading law schools to heed the calls for increased transparency, and will 
continue to serve a purpose even if the legal education industry adoptsor is made 
to adoptadditional reform in that area.  
                                                                                                                 
hope for improvement in the legal employment market, the “golden age” of BigLaw hiring is 
likely over. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have 
Started Before the Recession—And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 
2011, 4:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift/.  
 12. James G. Leipold, The Changing Legal Employment Market for New Law School 
Graduates, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 2010, at 6, 6. 
 13. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. 
 14. The term “Lost Generation” has been used by some to refer to the law school classes 
of 2008, 2009, and 2010. E.g., Lindsey Skerrett, The Lost Generation, JD RISING (May 31, 
2011), http://minnlawyer.com/jdr/2011/05/31/the-lost-generation/.  
 15. E.g., Leslie Kwoh, Irate Law School Grads Say They Were Misled About Job 
Prospects, STAR-LEDGER (Aug. 15, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www.nj.com/business/
index.ssf/2010/08/irate_law_school_grads_say_the.html (“As they enter the worst job 
market in decades, many young would-be lawyers are turning on their alma maters, blaming 
their quandary on high tuitions, lax accreditation standards and misleading job placement 
figures.”). 
 16. See infra notes 102−48 and accompanying text. 
 17. Complaint, Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, No. 37-2011-00091898-CU-
FR-CTL, 2011 WL 2109327 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2011). 
 18. Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 19. MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831, 2012 WL 2994107 
(W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012). 
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This Note is divided into four Parts. Part I briefly describes why, despite recent 
ABA reforms, there is still a need for law schools to be more transparent about the 
employment outcomes of their recent graduates. Part II describes a few methods by 
which law schools may be pressured to improve their transparency in this area if 
the ABA fails to take additional action in a timely fashion. With the context 
provided by Parts I and II, Part III uses the three above-mentioned cases, along 
with several others that were filed in 2012, to explore the special role this relatively 
novel type of class-action litigation may come to fill within the broader law school 
transparency movement. Some of the immediate effects of the lawsuits are 
discussed in Part IV. 
I. THE LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY PROBLEM 
With the benefit of hindsight, many recent law school graduates can now see 
clearly that their decision to go to law school was a mistake.20 While some of these 
graduates certainly could have—and should have—anticipated that law school 
might be a poor investment,21 others probably could not have realized ex ante just 
how financially ruinous their decision to go to law school would ultimately prove 
to be. For example, it would have been quite difficult for someone who applied to 
law schools in 2005 to anticipate how weak the entry-level legal employment 
market would be when she graduated in 2009.22 On the other hand, someone who 
started law school in 2008 or 2009 would have had more of an opportunity to 
observe the signs of weakness in the legal employment market before deciding to 
pursue a legal education. 
Although some of the blame for the dire financial position in which many recent 
law school graduates find themselves “surely rests with law students and graduates 
who did not perform their due diligence before deciding whether to attend law 
school[, a] good portion of the blame . . . rests squarely on the shoulders of law 
schools and their lack of transparency in representing the state of the legal 
market.”23 “Many law schools all but explicitly promise[d] that, within a few 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. Twenty-one percent of law students regret their decision to go to law school. 
LEXISNEXIS, STATE OF THE LEGAL INDUSTRY SURVEY, 29 (2009), available at http://www.
lexisnexis.com/document/State_of_the_Legal_Industry_Survey_Findings.pdf. Because 
recent graduates are confronted with the harsh realities of the legal employment market more 
directly than current law students are, the percentage of recent graduates who regret going to 
law school is presumably higher. 
 21. Moira Herbst, Lawsuits Against Law Schools Weak: Legal Ed Experts, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/New_York/News/ 
2012/02_-_February/Lawsuits_against_law_schools_weak__legal_ed_experts/ (quoting Professor 
Mark Gergen) (“‘People going to bottom-tier law schools ought to know that they won’t go like 
hot cakes on the job market.’ . . . But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to exploit their 
vulnerability.”). 
 22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 23. Daniel S. Harawa, Note, A Numbers Game: The Ethicality of Law School Reporting 
Practices, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 607 (2011). It is true that law schools are not the 
only institutions of higher education that have been accused of misrepresenting the 
employment opportunities available to graduates. E.g., Mark C. Taylor, Reform the PhD 
System or Close It Down, 472 NATURE 261 (2011) (“In many fields, [the American Ph.D. 
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months of graduation, practically all of their graduates [would] obtain jobs as 
lawyers,” even though the realities of the legal employment market often meant 
that less than half of those students would obtain full-time legal positions.24 
Dissatisfied “customers” of such law schools might be faulted for taking that 
school-specific information at face value, but belated admonitions of caveat emptor 
are not particularly helpful to students who have already borrowed hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to obtain a degree that has proven to be of little economic 
value to them.25 
Of course, there are those who believenot unreasonably, perhapsthat 
prospective law students should be able to take at face value the information law 
schools provide regarding the employment outcomes of their recent graduates.26 
One would certainly hope that prospective law students would be savvy enough to 
see through some law schools’ efforts to obfuscate their employment statistics, but 
one might also hope that law school administrators and ABA officials would take it 
upon themselves to ensure that naïve, would-be lawyers are provided with all of the 
information they need to make an informed decision about whether and where to 
attend law school. After all, practicing lawyers are prohibited from making 
misleading statements about their services, even when the statements are 
technically truthful.27 It seems reasonable to expect law school 
                                                                                                                 
system] creates only a cruel fantasy of future employment that promotes the self-interest of 
faculty members at the expense of students. The reality is that there are very few jobs for 
people who might have spent up to 12 years on their degrees.”). However, even assuming 
arguendo that Ph.D. programs mislead prospective students about the value of their degrees 
to the same extent that law schools do (an unlikely proposition given the extremely 
aggressive marketing practices employed by many law schools), that would merely mean 
that reform is needed in both areas, not that there is not a transparency problem in the legal 
education industry. 
 24. Paul Campos, Served: How Law Schools Completely Misrepresent Their Job 
Numbers, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 25, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/87251/law-
school-employment-harvard-yale-georgetown?page=0,0. 
 25. Compare MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831, 2012 WL 
2994107, at *11 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012) (“The bottom line is that the statistics provided 
by Cooley and other law schools in a format required by the ABA were so vague and 
incomplete as to be meaningless and could not reasonably be relied upon. But, as put in the 
phrase we lawyers learn early in law school—caveat emptor.”), with Paul Campos, Caveat 
Emptor and Law School Employment Numbers, INSIDE L. SCH. SCAM (Sept. 11, 2011), 
http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2011/09/caveat-emptor-and-law-school-
employment.html (“To anyone who has taken the time to investigate the subject, it’s obvious 
that the standard practices of law schools regarding their employment numbers fail” to 
satisfy “[t]he nasty old common law doctrine of caveat emptor.”). 
 26. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, How the Rankings Arms 
Race Has Undercut Morality, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2011, at 8, 9; Campos, supra note 25; 
Herbst, supra note 21; see generally Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict 
Between Public Good and For-Profit Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 47 (2011) (discussing ethics 
in the for-profit higher education industry). 
 27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (“A lawyer shall not make a false or 
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is 
false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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administratorsmany of whom are or have been members of the barto be 
equally cautious about the claims they make regarding the economic value of the 
education their schools provide.28 
Unfortunately, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the 
employment statistics reported by many law schoolseven if truthful in a technical 
sensehave nevertheless painted an unrealistically positive picture of the legal 
employment market. Various commentators have identified numerous problems 
with the way law schools report their employment statistics,29 but much of the 
criticism law schools have received in this area has centered around two major 
problems: (1) the employment statistics law schools provided to prospective 
students were, until recently, “so vague and incomplete as to be meaningless”30; 
and (2) these statistics have been, and continue to be, based on unaudited reports 
compiled by the law schools themselves. 
A. “Employment” ≠ “Gainful Employment” 
The most obvious problem with the employment statistics law schools provide 
to prospective law students is the fact that, for many years (this recently changed),31 
the ABA allowed law schools to count graduates doing almost any kind of work—
including part-time work, temporary work, and nonlegal work—as “employed” for 
purposes of their published employment rates.32 Thus, graduates who worked part-
time at Starbucks were considered just as “employed” as graduates who made six-
figure salaries working at large law firms,33 even though prospective law students 
generally attend law school expecting to obtain full-time work for which a law 
degree is required or preferred, and generally need to find such a job in order to be 
able to service their student loans after graduation.  
Similarly, for many years, law schools were able to further inflate their 
employment statistics by offering graduates low-paying, temporary positions 
funded by the law schools themselves so otherwise jobless graduates would be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Ben Trachtenberg, Law School Marketing and Legal Ethics 38 (Univ. Missouri Sch. 
L. Leg. Stud. Research Paper No. 2012-41, 2012) (“In addition to violating moral norms 
against lying, dishonest law school marketing, when committed by lawyers, violates rules of 
professional conduct enacted to regulate the legal profession.”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192694. 
 29. See generally Kyle P. McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward: Transparency 
at American Law Schools, 32 PACE L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 30. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 2012 WL 2994107, at *11. 
 31. See infra notes 48−57 and accompanying text. 
 32. Amended Complaint at 25–27, Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., 943 
N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2011) (No. 652226/2011), Doc. No. 10 [hereinafter 
NYLS Complaint]; Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 2012 WL 2994107, at *6. 
 33. This practice is even more indefensible in light of the fact that, for many years, the 
National Association of Law Placement has collected comprehensive employment statistics 
from most law schools. See NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 26. That data was used by 
NALP to compile aggregate statistical information about the employment outcomes of 
graduates of all ABA-approved law schools, but law schools were not required to release 
that information to the public. Id.; see also infra notes 48−50 and accompanying text. 
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considered “employed” for purposes of the school’s employment statistics.34 For 
example, Washington and Lee University School of Law reported that 89.4% of its 
2010 graduates were employed at graduation despite the fact that 46.3% of those 
counted as “employed” at graduation were actually employed as “Post-Grad 
Fellows” by the law school.35 Although Washington and Lee did disclose on its 
website the number of its students receiving these temporary positions36 (something 
law schools with similar programs have not always done),37 the 89.4% 
figurewithout caveatsis what the school reported to U.S. News.38 Considering 
that less than half of the 2010 Washington and Lee class had actually managed to 
secure permanent employment by graduation,39 it seems relatively clear that, at 
least in this instance, the employment data Washington and Lee reported to U.S. 
News painted an unrealistically positive picture of the employment opportunities 
available to recent graduates of that law school. Thus, prospective law students 
who relied primarily on U.S. News for information about potential law schools 
might have grossly underestimated just how difficult it would be for them to secure 
gainful employment after law school. 
B. Unaudited, Self-Reported Surveys Are Inherently Unreliable 
The second major problem with the way law schools have been reporting their 
employment data stems from the fact that the data is necessarily based on self-
reported surveys of recent graduates.40 Because law schools need only report 
information from graduates who willingly return the surveys, law schools’ 
employment statistics—especially their salary statistics—are often based on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Bernie Burk, A Stunning But Largely Unnoticed Anomaly in Recent Employment 
Outcomes Data Suggests That Things May Be Even Worse Out There than We Imagined, 
FACULTY LOUNGE (Mar. 19, 2012, 10:27 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/03/a-
stunning-but-largely-unnoticed-anomaly-in-recent-employment-outcomes-data-suggests-
that-things-may.html. 
 35. Employment Statistics for the Class of 2010, WASH. & LEE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Admissions/FINAL%20Statistical%20Report%20Class%20of
%202010-9%20Month.pdf [hereinafter WASH. & LEE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW] (figures exclude 
graduates seeking advanced degrees rather than employment). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Bernie Burk, Employment Outcomes II: What We Know About School-Funded 
Temporary “Bridge” Positions at First-Tier Law Schools, FACULTY LOUNGE (Mar. 28, 2012, 
2:37 PM), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/03/employment-outcomes-ii-what-we-
know-about-school-funded-temporary-bridge-positions-at-first-tier-law.html. 
 38. See Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Methodology: Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPORT (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings. Although 
U.S. News plans to follow the ABA in requiring law schools to report more “granular” 
employment data in the future, it did not do so for its most recent rankings. Id.  
 39. See WASH. & LEE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 35. 
 40. Law schools must report “the placement in employment of, and types of 
employment obtained by, graduates of the institution’s degree or certificate programs, 
gathered from such sources as alumni surveys, student satisfaction surveys, . . . or other 
relevant sources.” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(R) (Supp. IV 2011). 
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unrepresentative samples of recent graduates.41 For example, based on a sampling 
of just 22% of its 2010 graduates, New York Law School (NYLS) reported that the 
average starting salary for its graduates in private practice is $107,343.42 However, 
because alumni in high paying jobs are more likely to receive and respond to salary 
surveys than are the unemployed and underemployed, the true average salary 
earned by graduates of NYLS’s 2010 graduating class was likely significantly 
lower than the reported average.43  
NYLS is by no means the only law school to boast of high salaries based on 
relatively small samples of its recent graduates. Indeed, in the 2012 U.S. News law 
school rankings, nearly seventy law schools posted salary figures taken from half or 
fewer of their graduates with full-time jobs in the private sector, with four schools 
using salary figures taken from just five to 10% of those graduates.44 While one 
might expect that such low response rates merely reflect the sensitive nature of the 
surveys, the fact that some law schools, including some lower-ranked law schools, 
are able to obtain salary information from most of their recent graduates indicates 
that law schools clearly could obtain salary information from their graduates if the 
law schools made obtaining that information a priority.45 Further, the fact that a 
number of law schools already collect at least some employment data from 
virtually all of their graduates suggests that collecting salary information from 
recent graduates would probably not require a significant expenditure of additional 
institutional resources.46  
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 146−47. Further, until relatively recently, U.S. News & 
World Report counted as employed 25% of those graduates whose employment status was 
unknown. Bob Morse, ABA May Revise Law School Job Reporting, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2011/
03/17/aba-may-revise-law-school-job-reporting. This provided law schools with a 
disincentive to seek employment information from those graduates they suspected of being 
unemployed. Henderson & Morriss, supra note 26, at 9. 
 42. See NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 21–22. For additional examples, see 
TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 146−54; see also Leipold, supra note 12, at 11 for a discussion 
of how the bimodal distribution of entry-level legal salaries may also cause students to 
overestimate what starting salary they are likely to earn upon graduation.  
 43. See NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 24−25. 
 44. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 146−47. 
 45. Id. at 147−49 (explaining that although there is generally a strong correlation 
between a law school’s U.S. News ranking and the percentage of its graduates who report 
their full-time, private-sector salaries, “[a] number of lower-ranked schools have relatively 
high response rates: Texas Southern (97 percent); Charlotte (86 percent); and La Verne (85 
percent)”). 
 46. For example, the Indiana University Maurer School of Law managed to obtain 
information regarding the employment status of all but one of the 195 members of its 2011 
graduating class, yet only collected salary information for seventy-three of those graduates. 
NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, INDIANA UNIVERSITY MAURER SCHOOL OF LAW-
BLOOMINGTON: CLASS OF 2011 SUMMARY REPORT (2012), available at http://www.law.
indiana.edu/careers/reports/doc/nalp_2011.pdf. Presumably, the institutional resources 
involved in encouraging graduates to be more forthcoming about their salary information are 
relatively small compared to the institutional resources required to distribute and process the 
employment surveys themselves. 
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As the foregoing discussion suggests, even if law school administrators had 
followed the ABA’s reporting guidelines scrupulously, the employment statistics 
they reported would have exaggerated the success recent alums have had obtaining 
gainful employment. Obviously, the problem would be much worse if law school 
administrators actually reported factually inaccurate data. Unfortunately, because 
the employment data law schools report is not independently audited, it would be 
extremely difficult to catch a law school in the act of falsifying its data.47 The fact 
that some law school administrators have already exhibited a willingness to falsify 
the data they report to the ABA thus provides a compelling reason to maintain a 
healthy skepticism about the accuracy of the already misleading employment 
statistics.48 
C. Recent ABA Reforms 
Fortunately, the ABA has finally begun to respond to demands for it to require 
law schools to make their employment statistics more useful to prospective 
students. In the past, most law schools reported detailed placement information to 
the National Association of Law Placement (NALP), but only reported basic (and 
relatively unhelpful) placement data to the ABA and the public.49 Under pressure, 
some law schools eventually began to release their NALP reports to the public,50 
but law schools were never required to release those reports and NALP only ever 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. See Letter from Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator, to Stephen N. Zack, President of the 
Am. Bar Ass’n (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/Boxer-
ABA_Letter_May_2011.pdf. The ABA may impose penalties on law schools that 
intentionally report fraudulent data, see A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO BAR, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION 103 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.abanow.org/2012/06/2012am103/; Amendment Made to Standard 509, Rule 16 
and Foreign Program Criteria, AMERICANBAR.ORG (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/syllabus_home/volume_44_2012-2013/fall_2012/2012-2013_changestoaba
standardsandrules.html, but the lack of any mechanism for independently verifying the data 
law schools report makes the deterrent value of such penalties questionable. 
 48. See infra note 73. A number of schools have also admitted to accidentally 
misreporting various figures. For example, several law schools—including Barry University 
School of Law, University of Kansas School of Law, and Rutgers School of Law 
(Camden)—have admitted to reporting that their students graduate with a lower level of 
average indebtedness than they actually do. Chelsea Phipps, Reports of Our (Low) Debt 
Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, WALL. ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 8, 2012, 3:20 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/08/08/law-schools-misreported-debt-figures-to-us-news-aba/. 
While there has not yet been any indication that these figures were intentionally misreported, 
some commentators have expressed skepticism as to whether the misrepresentations were 
truly the result of “honest mistakes.” See, e.g., Staci Zaretsky, Law Schools Misreport Debt 
Figures to the ABA; To No One’s Shock, the ABA Does Nothing, ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 9, 
2012, 12:21 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/08/law-schools-misreport-debt-figures-to-
the-aba-to-no-ones-shock-the-aba-does-nothing/. 
 49. NALP and the ABA Must Compromise, L. SCH. TRANPSARENCY (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:28 
PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2011/08/nalp-and-the-aba-must-compromise/. 
 50. See infra notes 93−94 and accompanying text. 
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released the information reported by law schools in aggregate form.51 This 
unsatisfactory state of affairs began to change when the ABA’s Questionnaire 
Committee announced in July 2011 that it would begin requiring law schools to 
“unbundle” their placement statistics and report those statistics directly to the 
ABA.52 Specifically, the Committee announced: 
[T]he 2011 Annual Questionnaire will request from law schools 
information on their graduates’ employment status, employment types, 
and employment locations. It will also request information on whether 
a graduate’s employment is long-term or short-term. Finally, it will ask 
how many, if any, positions held by their graduates are funded by the 
law school or university.53 
In addition, the Committee announced that it would collect salary information from 
each of the law schools and report the “the 25th, median, and 75th percentile 
salaries of jobs obtained in the various types in each state and region” in the 
Official Guide to ABA Law Schools.54 
The ABA’s House of Delegates made further progress towards improving law 
school transparency as recently as August 2012 when it approved changes to 
Standard 509, the rule that describes the consumer information law schools must 
report to remain accredited by the ABA.55 For the most part, the changes brought 
Standard 509 in line with the changes already made by the Questionnaire 
Committee.56 However, the revised Standard 509 also requires law schools to 
disclose their scholarship retention rates and the sample size upon which their 
salary surveys are based.57 Given all of the criticism law schools have received over 
their lack of transparency in these two areas,58 these relatively minor changes 
represent a significant improvement over the status quo. 
Unfortunately, these much-needed reforms come far too late to be of any benefit 
to the thousands of recent graduates who have little to show for their three years in 
law school except six-figures worth of nondischargeable student loans. 
Additionally, the ABAso farhas rejected calls for it to force law school 
administrators to disclose the salary data the ABA collects from each law school,59 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. NALP and the ABA Must Compromise, supra note 49. 
 52. Memorandum from Hulett H. Askew, Consultant on Legal Education, and Arthur R. 
Gaudio, Chair, Questionnaire Committee, to Law School Deans and Career Services Officers 
1 (July 27, 2011), available at http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/documents/2011-07-
27-AskewGaudio-to-LawSchools.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 1−2. 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. ABA House of Delegates Approves Standard 509 and Rule 16, L. SCH. 
TRANSPARENCY (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/category/
american-bar-association/aba-watch/. 
 56. Karen Sloan, ABA Backs Off Making Law Schools Report Graduates’ Salaries, 
NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202546229913&slreturn=20120723155436. 
 57. A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO BAR, supra note 47, at 2−3. 
 58. See infra note 97; supra notes 38−42 and accompanying text. 
 59. Sloan, supra note 56. The chief problem with the ABA’s current approach (i.e. 
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and seems to have largely ignored requests that it start requiring law schools to 
have their employment statistics independently audited. The ABA’s Task Force on 
the Future of Legal Education might eventually recommend such reforms, but the 
task force is not expected to complete its work until 2014.60 Given that the ABA 
has already taken some basic steps to improve law school transparency,61 there is 
good reason to believe that the ABA will wait until after the task force releases its 
findings before implementing any additional reforms designed to improve law 
school transparency. 
D. A Caveat: Transparency Has Its Limits 
Of course, a lack of transparency regarding the employment outcomes of recent 
graduates is by no means the only problem facing the legal education industry 
today.62 Indeed, it must be admitted that increased transparency alone would 
probably not deter some law students from making poor decisions about whether 
and where to attend law school.63 For example, better information likely would not 
prevent some students from grossly overestimating their chances of maintaining 
their grade-contingent scholarships64 or securing high-paying work at a large law 
firm,65 and many prospective law students would probably continue to attach far 
too much importance to the U.S. News law school rankings.66 Nevertheless, even if 
                                                                                                                 
reporting aggregated salary data for each state) is that “[w]ithout the school-specific salary 
reporting, there is no way for prospective law students to differentiate between the graduate 
salaries of lower and higher-ranking law schools in any given state.” Id. 
 60. ABA President Names Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, ABA NOW 
(July 31, 2012), http://www.abanow.org/2012/07/aba-president-names-task-force-on-the-
future-of-legal-education/. 
 61. See supra notes 51−56 and accompanying text. 
 62. See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 2. 
 63. Sloan, supra note 3 (quoting Professor William Henderson) (“Even if [law schools] 
communicated the realities [of the legal employment market] in a statistically valid way to 
prospective students, some of them still won’t process that information.”). 
 64. Compare Segal, Behind the Curve, supra note 1 (arguing that law schools do a poor 
job of warning students about how difficult it will be for them to earn the grades necessary to 
maintain their grade-contingent scholarships), with Saul Levmore, The Rage Over 
Conditional Scholarships, UNIV. CHI. FACULTY BLOG (May 16, 2011, 3:32 PM), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2011/05/the-rage-over-conditional-scholarships.html 
(explaining that, in the author’s opinion, grade-contingent scholarships “[do] not so much set 
out to fool customers as [try] to deal with the problem of transfers”). Whether or not offering 
grade-contingent scholarship should be characterized as a “bait and switch” tactic, as Segal 
suggests, losing a grade-contingent scholarship can significantly alter the value proposition 
of attending law school, especially if it comes as a surprise to the person losing it. In any 
event, the ABA now requires law schools to disclose more information about scholarship 
retention rates than it once did. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 65. According to Dean Gary Roberts of the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law, “[m]any law students are like high school basketball players” who “all think 
they’ll play for the NBA when they graduate.” Rebecca Berfanger, Law Schools Discuss 
Loans, Jobs, IND. LAW. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/article?
articleId=25665. Consequently, according to Dean Roberts, “[i]f you’re a law student and 
think you’ll make $140,000 right out of law school, you’re an idiot.” Id. 
 66. In a recent poll of prospective law students, 32% said that a law school’s ranking is 
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some law students would not make good use of more accurate employment data, it 
is highly desirable that accurate employment data be collected anyway. At least 
some prospective law students would make good use of the additional 
information,67 and policymakers will need access to the information if they are to 
address the various other problems confronting the legal education industry today.68  
II. SOME RECENT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY PROBLEM 
The most obvious solution to the law school transparency problem is, of course, 
for the ABA to use its accrediting authority to force law schools to provide 
comprehensive, independently verified information about the employment 
outcomes of their recent graduates. Unfortunately, while recently enacted ABA 
reforms have closed some of the loopholes that had allowed law schools to count 
almost all of their graduates as “employed” regardless of how many of those 
graduates were actually able to secure gainful legal employment, the ABA has so 
far proven unwilling to require law schools to report detailed salary information or 
to have their employment statistics independently audited.69  
Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether these additional reforms are 
desirable,70 but assuming that it is desirable for law schools to provide more 
                                                                                                                 
the most critical factor in their decision about where to go to school, compared with 8% who 
considered a law school’s job placement statistics to be the most important factor. Russell 
Schaffer & Carina Wong, Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Despite an Uncertain Employment 
Landscape, Law School Applicants Still Consider School Rankings Far More Important than 
Job Placement Rates When Deciding Where to Apply (June 19, 2012), http://press.
kaptest.com/press-releases/kaplan-test-prep-survey-despite-an-uncertain-employment-land
scape-law-school-applicants-still-consider-school-rankings-far-more-important-than-job-
placement-rates-when-deciding-where-to-apply. But see Shocked About Kaplan's Survey 
Results? New Information Comes to Light, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY (Dec. 3, 2010, 12:04 
PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2010/12/shocked-about-kaplans-survey-results-
new-information-comes-to-light/ (explaining various reasons why an earlier edition of the poll 
may have overstated the emphasis prospective students attach to the rankings).  
 67. Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical 
Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 618 (2010) (“With more 
accurate information, the market should then take over as students who wish to succeed in 
the job market gravitate to those schools most able to facilitate their success.”). 
 68. For example, brutally honest information about the true state of the legal 
employment market might convince the Education Department “to force law schools to 
demonstrate, as a condition of receiving federal loan money, a minimum threshold of 
employability and income upon graduation.” Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 6. 
 69. See supra notes 59−60 and accompanying text. 
 70. Some argue that salary surveys should not be required because low response rates 
might make them misleading. Karen Sloan, ABA Backs off Making Law Schools Report 
Graduates’ Salaries, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticle
NLJ.jsp?id=1202546229913&slreturn=20120716083955. This is certainly a legitimate 
concern, but it seems that the better course would be to make a concerted effort to increase 
the response rates, not to simply deprive prospective law students of information they will 
need to determine whether it makes good economic sense for them to attend law school. 
Some law schools have also cited privacy concerns as a reason not to provide detailed salary 
information to the public. Initial Request Responses, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY (Sept. 14, 2010, 
12:01 AM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2010/09/initial-request-responses/ 
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comprehensive and more reliable information about the employment outcomes of 
their recent graduates, how can law schools be made to do this if the ABA is 
unwilling to take further steps to increase law school transparency? This Part 
highlights a few additional ways in which law schools could be further pressured to 
improve transparency in the relatively near future.71 Specifically, it addresses (A) 
the influence of U.S. News, (B) the voluntary efforts some law schools are taking to 
increase their own transparency, (C) the advocacy efforts of organizations like Law 
School Transparency, and (D) the possibility of action by Congress or the 
Department of Education.  
A. U.S. News & World Report 
 
For better or worse, U.S. News, a for-profit magazine that has often been 
accused of exacerbating the problems in the American legal education system,72 
probably has almost as much power as the ABA itself to solve the law school 
transparency problem. Law schools face tremendous pressure to improve their U.S. 
News ranking,73 and many will go to great lengths to do so, regardless of whether 
or not their efforts will improve the quality of the education they provide.74 
                                                                                                                 
(quoting administrators from various law schools). However, some schools have chosen to 
voluntarily release salary information that is quite detailed. E.g., Comprehensive 
Employment Statistics, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/careers/classstats/
Pages/employmentstats.aspx. This suggests that efforts to increase transparency in this area 
need not compromise the privacy of recent graduates. 
 71. This Part is by no means an exhaustive list of all of the possible methods for solving 
the law school transparency problems. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud & George Shepherd, Law 
Deans in Jail (Emory Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-199, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990746 (discussing the potential for 
action by the Department of Justice); Joel F. Murray, Professional Dishonesty: Do U.S. Law 
Schools That Report False or Misleading Employment Statistics Violate Consumer 
Protection Laws?, 15 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 97 (2012) (discussing the potential for action 
by the Federal Trade Commission). 
 72. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 78 (“When called to account for their conduct, 
legal educators point the finger at the US News ranking system.”); see generally Kyle P. 
McEntee & Derek M. Tokaz, Take This Job and Count It, 2 J.L. 309 (2012). 
 73. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Market Irrationality in the Law School “Arms Race,” 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-h-
greenwood/market-irrationality-in-t_b_856400.html (“Any school that dares to ignore the 
[U.S. News] rankings risks a death spiral of rapidly departing employers, students and 
faculty, leading to lower ranking and even more problems.”). Nancy Rapoport, the former 
dean of the University of Houston Law Center, even claims that the law school’s decline in 
the ranking provided the final push for her resignation as the school’s dean. Leigh Jones, 
Law School Deans Feel the Heat from Ranking, NAT’L L.J. (May 1, 2006), http://www.
law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005452512&Law_school_deans_feel_the_heat
_from_ranking. 
 74. See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, 
and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 232–42 (2006) for a 
discussion on the sometimes bizarre incentives the U.S. News rankings create for providers 
of legal education. For example, “a law school could literally burn a huge sum of money 
and, as long as the flames were meant to teach something to the students—the craziness of 
the U.S. News algorithm, perhaps?—the school would benefit in the rankings.” Answers to 
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Because job placement rates factor significantly into a law school’s ranking,75 and 
because law schools that do not massage their employment statistics will find 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those law schools that do, U.S. 
News—until recently—provided law school administrators with a disincentive to 
provide comprehensive data about the employment outcomes of their recent 
graduates.76 Fortunately, U.S. News’s editors now seem to agree that there is a need 
for increased law school transparency.77 The magazine has already changed its 
methodology in the attempt to provide a more realistic portrait of the current job 
market for new J.D. graduates,78 and plans to incorporate a recent ABA reform (i.e. 
the requirement that law schools “reveal such key stats as how many graduates had 
jobs that are full time or part time, short term or long term, and that actually require 
the J.D. degree”) into its methodology for future rankings.79  
These changes represent an improvement over the methodology used in 
previous versions of the ranking, but U.S. News could probably push law schools to 
provide even more comprehensive and reliable information about the employment 
outcomes of their recent graduates if the magazine chose to do so. Given the great 
lengths to which law school administrators will go to improve their U.S. News 
ranking, it is likely that law schools would, for example, provide detailed salary 
                                                                                                                 
Reader Questions About Law School, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011, 11:08 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/answers-to-reader-questions-about-
law-school/. That law school administrators act with those incentives in mind was evidenced 
by a recent report that concluded the U.S. News law school ranking, not the ABA 
Accreditation standards, has largely driven the rising cost of American legal education. See 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-20, HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED TO 
LAW SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS 25 (2009). Indeed, some law school administrators have 
even proved willing to engage in fraudulent activity to better their U.S. News ranking. For 
example, Villanova University School of Law has been censured by the ABA for reporting 
inaccurate admissions. Letter from Hulett H. Askew, Consultant on Legal Educ. to the ABA, 
to Peter M. Donohue, President, Villanova Univ., and John Y. Gotanda, Dean, Villanova 
Univ. Sch. of Law (Aug. 12, 2011). The University of Illinois has also admitted to similar 
misconduct. JONES DAY & DUFF & PHELPS, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW CLASS 
PROFILE REPORTING 2–5 (2011). 
 75. See Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Methodology: Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings (explaining 
that various indices of “placement success” are weighted by .20 in formula the magazine 
uses to compile its rankings). 
 76. See Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test?, 81 IND. L.J. 25, 27 
(2006) (“[M]any schools would prefer not to have to manipulate these factors, but the 
current system of ranking strongly pressures them to do so. If schools do not engage in 
manipulation, but their competitors do, then they will lose students—and eventually much 
else as well.”). 
 77. See Bob Morse, U.S. News Urges Law School Deans to Improve Employment Data, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (March 9, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/college-rankings-blog/2011/03/09/us-news-urges-law-school-deans-to-improve-
employment-data. 
 78. See Morse & Flanigan, supra note 75 (“For the second year in row, . . . employment 
rates are figured solely based on the number of grads working at that point in time full or 
part time in a legal or nonlegal job divided by the total number of J.D. graduates.”). 
 79. Id.; see also supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.  
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information or agree to have their employment statistics independently verified if 
doing so were a prerequisite for inclusion in future editions of the ranking.80 
However, even though U.S. News probably has the power to unilaterally demand 
more robust data from law schools, the magazine’s rankings guru, Bob Morse, has 
indicated that the magazine would prefer for the ABAthe organization actually 
charged with regulating law schoolsto take a leadership role in this area.81  
Furthermore, U.S. News has little incentive to promote reform in this area. U.S. 
News is in the business of selling magazines, and it would almost certainly sell 
fewer copies of its annual law school guide if it did anything that might discourage 
prospective students from attending law school.82 To be sure, U.S. News may need 
to change its methodology somewhat from time to time in order to maintain its 
perceived legitimacy,83 but it is simply unrealistic to expect U.S. News to use its 
influence to spearhead a permanent solution to the law school transparency 
problem.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. After all, some law schools have even radically reduced the numbers of part-time 
students they accept in apparent response to changes in the ranking’s methodology. See 
TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 87−88 (describing how the George Washington and Brooklyn 
law schools greatly reduced their part-time classes once enrolling large numbers of part-time 
students was no longer beneficial to their U.S. News rankings). If law schools are willing to 
make such drastic changes at U.S. News’ behest, it seems reasonable to expect that they 
would also be willing to comply with relatively simple reporting requirements. 
 81. Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, supra note 1 (quoting Bob Morse) (“And 
what about U.S. News? The editors could, but won’t unilaterally demand better data from 
law schools. ‘Do we have the power to do that? Yes, I think we do,’ said Robert Morse, who 
oversees the law school rankings. ‘But . . . it would be awkward if U.S. News imposed [a 
new standard] by itself. It would be preferable if the A.B.A. took a leadership role in this.’”).  
 82. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, Most Schools Would Like Law School Transparency to Just 
Go Away, ABOVE THE L. (Sept. 14, 2010, 2:16 PM), http://www.abovethelaw.com/
2010/09/most-schools-would-like-law-school-transparency-to-just-go-away/ (“What possible 
reason does U.S. News have to ask more detailed questions about employment statistics? So 
it can tacitly admit it has been part of the problem all along? So more people read it and 
think ‘. . . I shouldn’t go to law school,’ which does nothing but hurt the (for-profit) 
magazine’s newsstand sales and circulation? U.S. News will never stand up to law schools 
and force them to stop inflating their employment numbers, not so long as the magazine’s 
business managers want to keep people thinking about going to law school.”). 
 83. U.S. News has significant power over law schools because “students choosing 
between law schools attach preeminent weight to the ranking,” at least in part, because top 
law firms hire heavily from highly ranked law schools. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 79. 
Presumably, if prospective students and hiring partners at top law firms were to agree that 
the rankings were materially flawed, they would cease to attach as much importance to the 
rankings. Consequently, U.S. News might have to change its methodology from time to time 
based on the opinions of these two groups. On the other hand, the fact that many legal 
educators believe the ranking to be flawed is seemingly irrelevant. “Legal educators 
endlessly gripe that the US News ranking is bunk, poking holes in every aspect of its 
construction and methodology,” yet these complaints have no apparent effect on their 
behavior because “the ranking creates its own reality.” Id. at 79−80. 
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B. Voluntary Self-Imposed Reform 
Law schools could, of course, disclose more information than what the ABA 
requires regarding the employment outcomes achieved by recent graduates, and 
some law schools have already started to do that.84 Such efforts could potentially 
put pressure on other law schools to do the same. When comparing similarly 
ranked law schools, some prospective law students would be expected to draw 
adverse inferences against schools that were less forthright than their peers 
regarding the employment outcomes of their recent graduates.85 As more law 
schools voluntarily publish comprehensive employment statistics on their websites, 
or provide that information to third parties like Law School Transparency,86 
holdouts would probably feel increasing pressure to do the same. 
Although law schools that have taken initiative in this area are pushing the rest 
of the legal education industry in the right direction, such efforts alone are unlikely 
to solve the law school transparency problem. That is because a significant number 
of prospective students care a great deal more about a law school’s ranking than 
they do about its employment statistics.87 Thus, to the extent that providing better 
employment data was incompatible with maintaining a strong U.S. News rank, the 
pressure law school administrators experience to maintain their school’s ranking 
would probably outweigh any peer pressure they would experience to provide 
better employment data.  
More importantly, efforts by law schools to voluntarily improve their 
transparency have concentrated mostly on the types of reforms the ABA recently 
implemented, such as distinguishing between full-time employment and part-time 
employment. While some law schools do provide salary information about their 
recent graduates,88 even schools recognized for their transparency efforts continue 
to produce salary statistics based on information collected from relatively small 
percentages of their graduating classes.89 Similarly, there have been few efforts to 
address the concern that the data law schools report is not independently verified. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. For an evaluation of the transparency of each accredited law school’s website, see 
Transparency Index, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/
reform/projects/transparency-index/. 
 85. See David Lat, The University of Chicago Law School Offers Detailed Employment 
Data; Will Other Schools Follow Suit?, ABOVE THE L. (Dec. 14, 2011, 10:19 AM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/12/the-university-of-chicago-law-school-offers-detailed-
employment-data-will-other-schools-follow-suit/. 
 86. See infra Part II.C. 
 87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Transparency Index, supra note 84. 
 89. For example, the University of Michigan Law School was recently voted the most 
honest law school in America in an Above the Law reader poll, Elie Mystal, ATL March 
Madness (2012): Michigan Is the Most Honest Law School, ABOVE THE L. (Apr. 2, 2012, 
6:03 PM), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/04/atl-march-madness-2012-michigan-is-the-
most-honest-law-school/, and yet the percentage of graduates responding to the law school’s 
salary survey actually declined over recent years from 84% for the class of 2009 to only 60% 
for the class of 2011. Comprehensive Employment Statistics, supra note 70. While 
Michigan’s response rates compare favorably with the national average (65% for the class of 
2010 compared to the national average of 58% for the same year), id., they do not compare 
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While it is conceivable that law schools that have been relatively forthcoming 
about their employment statistics might turn their attention to these additional 
reforms now that the ABA has begun requiring all law schools to disaggregate their 
employment statistics, it seems relatively unlikely that law schools would 
implement these additional reforms on their own. Whereas earlier reforms merely 
required law schools to publicize information they were, for the most part, already 
collecting,90 many additional reforms (e.g. having employment data audited by a 
third party) would require the schools to incur some additional expense. Thus, it is 
somewhat unlikely that enough law schools would take initiative in this area that 
other schools would experience pressure to do the same. 
C. Law School Transparency 
Law School Transparency (LST) is a Tennessee nonprofit that has been at the 
forefront of the law school transparency movement. Its advocacy efforts have been 
influential in raising awareness about the problem of law school transparency,91 and 
its website is one of the best sources for comprehensive information and breaking 
news on the subject.92 Further, after some initial resistance, it appears that at least 
some law schools are beginning to take LST’s message seriously. In 2010, the 
organization sent letters to every ABA-approved law school seeking very detailed 
employment statistics, but no law school provided the information LST requested.93 
However, in late 2011, LST sent a second round of letters in which it asked law 
school administrators to merely release the detailed employment statistics the 
schools had already reported to NALP for the class of 2010.94 Over fifty schools 
complied with this second request, either by sending the information to LST 
directly or by making the information available on their websites.95  
                                                                                                                 
favorably with, for example, the 98.56% response rate achieved by Harvard Law School 
(also for the class of 2010). Employment Statistics, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.
harvard.edu/current/careers/ocs/employment-statistics/index.html. Of course, most graduates 
of an elite law school like Michigan are probably able to secure high-paying jobs if they 
desire to go into private practice, but a sample of only 60% of a law school’s graduating 
class might be quite unrepresentative at a law school that has a more difficult time placing 
graduates in good positions. 
 90. See NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 26; supra notes 49−54 and accompanying 
text. 
 91. See, e.g., McEntee & Lynch, supra note 29; McEntee & Tokaz, supra note 72. 
 92. See L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/. 
 93. Karen Sloan, Law School Transparency Hopes the Second Time’s the Charm on 
Data, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202535790371&Law_School_Transparency_hopes_the_second_times_the_charm_on_data
&slreturn=1. 
 94. LST Requests Class of 2010 Employment Information from Law Schools, L. SCH. 
TRANSPARENCY (Dec. 14, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/
2011/12/lst-requests-class-of-2010-employment-information-from-law-schools/. For LST’s 
most recent data request, see LST Requests Class of 2011 NALP Reports, L. SCH. 
TRANSPARENCY (June 28, 2012, 3:21 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2012/06/
lst-requests-class-of-2011-nalp-reports/. 
 95. Class of 2010 NALP Report Database, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.
lawschooltransparency.com/clearinghouse/2010-nalp-report-database/. 
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Although the positive response LST received to its second request is 
encouraging, the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of American law 
schools are still withholding the data LST requested. Thus, while pressure from 
organizations like LST may have persuaded some law schools to release more 
detailed employment statistics than what the ABA requires those schools to 
disclose, LST lacks any authority to force compliance with its requests. 
Consequently, about three-fourths of ABA-approved law schools are still ignoring 
those requests.96 
D. Congress and/or the Department of Education 
Given the interest of at least a few members of Congressincluding Sen. 
Barbara Boxer, Sen. Tom Coburn, and Sen. Charles Grassleyin the law school 
transparency problem,97 one possible (though somewhat extreme) solution to the 
problem would involve Congress or the Department of Education stripping the 
ABA of its accrediting authority and giving that authority to some other 
organization that would implement the reforms the ABA is either unable or 
unwilling to impose on law schools. While unlikely, such drastic action is not 
completely implausible because the ABA has long been criticized for using its 
accrediting authority in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner,98 and the National 
Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity recently found that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. There are currently 201 ABA-approved law schools that confer J.D. degrees. ABA-
Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools.html.  
 97. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Lawmakers Probe Data from Law Schools, WALL ST. J. Nov. 
14, 2011, at A5 (stating that unnamed U.S. senators are “strongly considering” the 
possibility of holding hearings on the state of American legal education); Letter from 
Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator, to Stephen N. Zack, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, (May 20, 2011) 
(commenting on the need for independent oversight in the collection of employment data, 
easy access to employment information by students, and additional transparency regarding 
merit-based scholarship retention rates), available at http://www.lawschool
transparency.com/Boxer-ABA_Letter_May_2011.pdf; Letter from Tom A. Coburn & 
Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senators, to Kathleen Tighe, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Oct. 
13, 2011), available at http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/documents/2011-10-13-
Coburn-and-Boxer-to-Dept-of-Education-IG.pdf (asking the Inspector General to answer six 
questions regarding the cost and effectiveness of law school education over the last ten 
years); Letter from Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Stephen N. Zack, President, Am. 
Bar Ass’n (July 11, 2011), available at http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/
documents/2011-07-11-Grassley-to-ABA.pdf (asking thirty-one questions about the 
retention of merit-based scholarships and the ABA’s accreditation process).  
 98. See, e.g., Mathew D. Staver & Anita L. Staver, Lifting the Veil: An Exposé on the 
American Bar Association’s Arbitrary and Capricious Accreditation Process, 49 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1 (2003). In late 2011, the ABA was sued by Lincoln Memorial University Duncan 
School of Law after the ABA denied the law school provisional accreditation. See 
Complaint, Lincoln Mem’l Univ. Duncan Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 3:11-cv-608 
(E.D. Tenn. 2011). The lawsuit illustrates the difficult position in which the ABA finds 
itself: it has been widely criticized for not imposing more stringent accreditation standards 
on law schools, but if it does, it risks being sued for violating antitrust laws. 
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ABA was not in compliance with seventeen regulations applicable to the use of its 
accrediting authority.99 A similar, less drastic option would be for the Department 
of Education to require law schools to demonstrate, as a condition of receiving 
federally guaranteed student loans, that their graduates enjoy a certain minimum 
level of employment success upon graduation.100  
While it is certainly possible that Congress (or the Department of Education at 
Congress’ behest) could take action that would require law schools to be more 
transparent about the employment outcomes of their recent graduates, the 
possibility of such action seems very remote. By requiring law schools to report 
more comprehensive employment statistics and to disclose information about their 
scholarship retention rates, the ABA has already addressed many of the concerns 
expressed by members of Congress.101 True, the ABA has so far largely ignored 
some other concerns the senators expressed (e.g. the fact that the employment data 
is not independently audited), but the fact that the ABA has finally begun to 
address the law school transparency problem makes the need for congressional 
action less pressing than it might have otherwise been. Further, congressional 
action will necessarily be a long time coming, if it comes at all,102 so those with an 
interest in promoting law school transparency would therefore be wise to pursue 
other potential avenues of reform while waiting on Congress to take up the issue. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’AL QUALITY AND INTEGRITY, REPORT OF THE JUNE 
8–10 MEETING 14 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-
dir/spring-2011-report.pdf. 
 100. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 6. Another less severe solution would be to 
allow the ABA to retain its accreditation authority, but require law schools to submit annual 
reports directly to the Department of Education. This was the approach advocated by a 
coalition of the presidents of fifty-five individual law school Student Bar Associations. See 
SBA President Coalition Endorses Ideas Behind New Bill, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY (May 18, 
2011, 8:15 AM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2011/05/sba-president-coalition-
endorses-ideas-behind-new-bill/. However, some commentators believe such a drastic 
approach to be premature. See id. 
 101. Compare supra notes 49−58 and accompanying text, with supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. At the end of 2011, there were rumors that the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation would hold hearings on law schools during 2012. 
Karen Sloan, The Year the Chickens Came Home to Roost, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 26, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202536517436&slreturn=20120716121
336. As of August 15, 2012, however, no congressional committee had formally announced 
its intention to conduct hearings on the subject of law school reform. Thus, there is good 
reason to suspect that members of Congress will wait until after the ABA’s Task Force on 
the Future of Legal Education completes its work before Congress itself begins any formal 
investigation into the subject. See ABA President Names Task Force on the Future of Legal 
Education, supra note 60. The task force is not expected to release its findings until 2014. 
See id.  
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III. CLASS-ACTION LAWSUITS AS A SOLUTION TO THE LAW SCHOOL 
TRANSPARENCY PROBLEM 
 
On May 26, 2011, Anna Alaburda, a 2008 honors graduate of Thomas Jefferson 
School of Law (TJSL), sued the law school in California state court on behalf of a 
purported class comprised of as many as 2300 recent graduates and current TJSL 
students,103 claiming:  
 
TJSL is more concerned with raking in millions of dollars in tuition and 
fees than educating and training its students. The disservice TJSL is 
doing to its students and society generally is readily apparent. Many 
TJSL graduates will never be offered work as attorneys or otherwise be 
in a position to profit from their law school education. And they will be 
forced to repay hundreds of thousands of dollars in school loans that are 
nearly impossible to discharge, even in bankruptcy.104 
 
The lawsuit pleaded several causes of action—including intentional fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, and various unfair business practices—arising from 
the law school’s publication of allegedly misleading employment statistics and 
sought compensatory damages and restitution in excess of $50 million, plus 
punitive damages and injunctive relief.105 
Although TJSL was the first law school to be sued by recent graduates because 
of its misleading employment statistics,106 it certainly will not be the last. Similar 
lawsuits have already been filed against NYLS,107 Thomas M. Cooley Law School 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. See Third Amended Complaint at 7, Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, No. 
37-2011-00091898-CU-FR-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter TJSL 
Complaint]. Applicable statutes of limitation will limit the potential class sizes of such 
lawsuits. See Order Regarding Rulings at Oral Argument, Macdonald v. Thomas M. Cooley 
Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-831, at 4 (W.D. Mich. June 7, 2012), ECF No. 51. Because the class 
members could have arguably relied upon any fraudulent statements in deciding to stay 
enrolled in the law school, the appropriate point at which to start counting for purposes of 
applicable statutes of limitation is probably the beginning of each student’s last semester of 
law school (the last point at which they could have decided to stop paying Cooley additional 
tuition monies). See id. Of course, applicable statutes of limitation would limit the damages 
some otherwise eligible class members could claim. See id. 
 104. TJSL Complaint, supra note 103, at 2. 
 105. See id. at 9–17. 
 106. Alaburda was the first class-action lawsuit filed against a law school for alleged 
misrepresentation about its employment statistics, but it was not the first time a law school 
was sued for allegedly misrepresenting the value of its degrees. See, e.g., Rodi v. S. New 
England Sch. of Law, 532 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the defendants). Rodi claimed he was misled about the school’s 
accreditation status by letters from the school’s dean, and raised claims similar to those 
raised by Alaburda. The court found that Rodi did not rely on the statements, and that even if 
he did, his reliance was unreasonable. Id. at 17. It is worth noting, however, that the court 
had previously held that Rodi’s lawsuit stated valid claims under Massachusetts law. Rodi v. 
S. New England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 107. Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
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(“Cooley”),108 and several other law schools.109 So far, these lawsuits have met with 
mixed reactions by the courts, but they have at least raised the possibility that class-
action litigation could be used to help solve the law school transparency problem. 
This Part discusses this new type of litigation by first providing background 
information about the lawsuits, including precedent for them. It then discusses 
some possible objections that plaintiffs in the lawsuits will have to overcome if 
their claims are to succeed. 
 
A. “The Year of Law School Litigation” 
 
According to the NYLS and Cooley complaints, “false and fraudulent 
representations and omissions are endemic in the law school industry, as nearly 
every school to a certain degree blatantly manipulates their employment data to 
make themselves more attractive to prospective students.”110 Given this allegation, 
it is unsurprising that additional lawsuits followed relatively quickly after Anna 
Alaburda filed her lawsuit against TJSL on May 26, 2011. On August 10, 2011, 
attorneys from the Kurzon Strauss law firm filed purported class-action lawsuits on 
behalf of NYLS and Cooley’s graduates and current students.111 These 
attorneysparticularly David Anziska and Jesse Strauss (who now operate their 
own law firms)112have been at the forefront of the law school lawsuits ever 
since.113 
 
1. The Lawsuits Against NYLS & Cooley 
 
Like Alaburda’s complaint against TJSL, the complaints filed against NYLS and 
Cooley accused the law schools of fraud,114 negligent misrepresentation,115 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831, 2012 WL 2994107 
(W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012). 
 109. See infra notes 136−47 and accompanying text. 
 110. Amended Class Action Complaint at 4, Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831 
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2011) ECF No. 22 [hereinafter Cooley Complaint]; NYLS Complaint, 
supra note 32, at 5. 
 111. Class Action Complaint, Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831, ECF No. 1; 
Class Action Complaint, New York Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, Doc. No. 1. 
 112. In the fall of 2011, the Kurzon Strauss law firm dissolved and was replaced by two 
separate firms operated by former partners, Jeff Kurzon and Jesse Strauss. See KURZON LLP, 
http://kurzon.com/; STRAUSS L. PLLC, http://strausslawpllc.com/. Around the same time, 
David Anziska apparently started his own law firm. See L. OFFICES DAVID ANZISKA, 
http://www.anziskalaw.com/Home_Page.html. 
 113. Various other attorneys are involved in the lawsuits as well. See Staci Zaretsky, 
Twelve More Law Schools Slapped with Class Action Lawsuits Over Employment Data, 
ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 1, 2012, 2:53 PM), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/02/twelve-more-
law-schools-slapped-with-class-action-lawsuits-over-employment-data/. 
 114. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 56–60; TJSL Complaint, supra note 103, at 
11–14; NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 53–56. 
 115. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 60–63; TJSL Complaint, supra note 103, at 
15; NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 56–59. 
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various unfair business practices.116 Indeed, the three complaints were quite similar 
to each other in many respects, as Cooley noted in its Brief in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss.117 As with the TJLS complaint, the gist of both the NYLS and Cooley 
complaints was that the plaintiffs were “naïve, relatively unsophisticated 
consumers”118 who justifiably relied on misleading or inaccurate employment 
statistics in making their decision to attend law school.119 The relief requested in 
the NYLS and Cooley complaints was similar to that requested in the TJLS 
complaint as well,120 but given that all of the lawsuits seek to remedy “a systemic, 
ongoing fraud that is ubiquitous in the legal education industry,”121 some similarity 
among the lawsuits was probably unavoidable. 
It appears that one of the primary reasons the Kurzon Strauss attorneys targeted 
NYLS and Cooley for their first lawsuits is the fact that the schools are, in the 
words of those attorneys, veritable “JD factories.”122 To the extent this is a fair 
characterization of the two law schools, it is especially true of Cooley. Indeed, with 
approximately 4000 students at five campuses across Michigan and Florida,123 
being the largest law school in the country is actually one of Cooley’s stated 
goals.124 Given this goal, it is relatively unsurprising that Cooley also happens to be 
the least selective ABA-approved law school by a considerable margin: its 83% 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 54–56 (violations of the Michigan Consumer 
Protection Act); TJSL Complaint, supra note 103, at 9–11, 15–16 (violations of the 
California Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Act, and Consumer Legal Remedies 
Act); NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 50–53 (violations of the New York Deceptive Acts 
and Practices Law). 
 117. Brief in Support of Defendant Thomas M. Cooley Law School’s Motion to Dismiss 
at 4, MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 
2011), ECF No. 18 [hereinafter Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss] (“[T]he two Kurzon complaints 
repeat the same allegations from the Thomas Jefferson complaint . . . [a]nd each Kurzon 
complaint is a copy-and-paste job of the other—no fewer than 77 paragraphs of the 
complaints are nearly identical save the swapping of school names.”). 
 118. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 39; NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 34. 
 119. See Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 58, 61; NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, 
at 54, 57–58. 
 120. Compare Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 63–64, and NYLS Complaint, supra 
note 32, at 59–60, with TJLS Complaint supra note 103, at 16–17. While all three 
complaints request injunctive relief to order the law schools to change their marketing 
practices, injunctive relief is discussed at greater length in the Cooley and NYLS complaints. 
 121. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 1; NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 1. 
Future would-be plaintiffs might want to consider avoiding the use of such sweeping 
rhetoric. For example, Cooley seized upon that quote to argue (unsuccessfully) that the 
plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failing to join the ABA and NALP as parties even 
though the plaintiffs never actually requested that the court rewrite the ABA and NALP 
reporting standards. See Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 12–17; infra Part 
III.C.2. 
 122. Class Actions as a Tool of Social Change, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY (Aug. 10, 2011, 
2:47 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2011/08/class-actions-as-a-tool-of-social-
change/. 
 123. See Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 23.  
 124. BOARD OF DIRECTORS, THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCH., THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW 
SCHOOL’S STRATEGIC PLAN FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LEGAL EDUCATION 4 (2009). 
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acceptance rate is nearly 15 percentage points higher than the second least selective 
school.125 
These factors alone made Cooley a good target for a lawsuit, but Cooley is also 
unusually aggressive compared with its peers in the way it markets itself to 
prospective law students. For example, although U.S. News ranks Cooley in the 
bottom tier of law schools,126 Cooley’s founder, Thomas Brennan, and its current 
dean, Don DeLuc, publish their own annual ranking of law schools in which they 
recently ranked Cooley as the second-best law school in the country.127 
Presumably, Cooley’s ranking is designed to make the law school appear more 
attractive to prospective students, but the ranking has been widely criticized by the 
broader legal community.128 Nevertheless, Brennan and DeLuc—who incidentally 
earned $370,000 and $523,213, respectively, in 2009129—continue to publish the 
ranking year after year, no doubt to the chagrin of many Cooley alums. 
While NYLS enjoys a somewhat better reputation than Cooley,130 NYLS is also 
more expensive than Cooley. During the 2012–2013 academic year, NYLS charged 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 23−24. Cooley also boasts the lowest mean 
LSAT score (146) and mean undergraduate GPA (2.99) of any ABA-approved law school. 
Id. at 24. 
 126. Id. at 35. 
 127. See THOMAS E. BRENNAN & DON LEDUC, JUDGING THE LAW SCHOOLS 1 (12th ed. 
2010): available at http://www.cooley.edu/rankings/_docs/Judging_12th_Ed_2010.pdf. 
 128. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Commentary, How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 47, 51–
52 (2006) (“[T]he bizarre Thomas M. Cooley law school rankings . . . contain no useful 
information and are uniformly ignored by students, faculty, and in most discussions of 
rankings.”); Dora R. Bertram, Annotated Bibliography: Ranking of Law Schools by U.S. 
News & World Report 7 (Wash. Univ. St. Louis Sch. Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 10-08-03, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658653 (“[The 
Cooley ranking has been] [w]idely discredited and viewed as an alternative [to the U.S. News 
ranking] with the sole purpose of ranking the Thomas M. Cooley Law School highly.”); Elie 
Mystal, Latest Cooley Law School Rankings Achieve New Heights of Intellectual Dishonesty, 
ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 8, 2011, 6:23 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/latest-cooley-law-
school-rankings-achieve-new-heights-of-intellectual-dishonesty/ (“Cooley is not the second-
best law school in America and even the Cooley people responsible for putting together this 
list know it. You have to make your own decisions about what such intellectual dishonesty 
says about the people who made this list.”). 
 129. Cooley Complaint, supra note 110, at 6. 
 130. For example, it is ranked in the third-tier by U.S. News. See Best Law Schools: New 
York Law School, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.
rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/new-york-law-school-
03109. Additionally, in stark contrast to Cooley’s administration, Richard A. Matasar, who 
was until recently NYLS’ dean, “has been one of the legal academy’s most dogged and 
scolding critics, and he has repeatedly urged professors and fellow deans to rethink the 
basics of the law school business model and put the interests of students first.” Segal, Law 
School Economics, supra note 1. Segal believes the “strange case” of Richard Matasar 
illustrates why the legal education system probably cannot be reformed from within. Id. 
Whether or not Segal’s analysis is correct, the high-profile article (which also suggested that 
NYLS drastically increased its enrollment primarily to maintain its AAA Moody’s credit 
rating) did not paint a very flattering picture of the school. Consequently, the article may 
explain why NYLS was among one of the first law schools to be targeted for a lawsuit. 
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$49,225 in tuition and fees,131 making it about as expensive as several elite law 
schools.132 Especially in light of the large surplus of lawyers produced annually by 
the Empire State,133 the value proposition of attending NYLS is probably as 
questionable as the value proposition of attending Cooley. Thus, it is little wonder 
that the Kurzon Strauss law firm was able to find several NYLS alums willing to 
serve as named plaintiffs. 
 
2. More Lawsuits & Rumors of Lawsuits 
 
On October 5, 2011, David Anziska and Jesse Strauss, the lead attorneys in the 
lawsuits against NYLS and Cooley, announced plans to sue fifteen additional law 
schools when they found at least three alumni from each school willing to serve as 
named plaintiffs.134 At that time, they expressed a strong belief that “by the end of 
2012, almost every [law] school in the nation will be sued.”135 For their part, the 
attorneys said they hoped to make 2012 “the year of law school litigation” by suing 
“as many law schools” as possible, with the ultimate goal of eventually forcing “a 
global settlement through the ABA.”136 
On February 1, 2012, the lawyers followed through on their earlier threats by 
filing purported class-action lawsuits against an additional twelve law 
schoolsincluding Albany Law School of Union University,137 Brooklyn Law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Tuition and Financial Aid, N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.nyls.edu/prospective
_students/tuition_and_financial_aid.  
 132. See, e.g., Annual Cost of Attendance Budget, U. VA. SCH. L., http://www.law.
virginia.edu/html/prospectives/finaid/tuition.htm ($51,400 for nonresident tuition and fees); 
Estimated Budget, U. TEX. SCH. LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/finaid/costs/ ($49,244 for 
nonresident tuition and fees); 2012–2013 Tuition Fees per Semester, GEO. U. L. CENTER., 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/campus-services/student-accounts//upload/2012-13-GU-
Law-Tuition-Fees-posting.pdf ($48,835 for tuition and fees). 
 133. The state of New York is projected to need only 2100 new lawyers each year 
through 2015, but 9787 people passed the New York state bar exam in 2009. See Rampell, 
supra note 7. 
 134. See Karen Sloan, Another 15 Law Schools Targeted Over Jobs Data, NAT’L L.J. 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202517930210&slreturn
=20121003092042. According to Anziska and Strauss, they targeted these specific schools 
“either because alumni or students approached them with concerns, or because the 
postgraduate job data they have reported to the American Bar Association were 
‘implausible.’” Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Staci Zaretsky, Calling All Disgruntled Law School Graduates: Will You Ring in the 
New Year by Suing Your School, ABOVE THE L. (Dec. 14, 2011, 4:02 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/12/calling-all-disgruntled-law-school-graduates-will-you-ring-
in-the-new-year-by-suing-your-school/ (quoting David Anziska). 
 137. Class Action Complaint, Austin v. Albany Law Sch. of Union Univ., No. 
A00014/2012, 2013 WL 45884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012), ECF No. 1. This lawsuit was 
dismissed after the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division issued its Gomez-Jimenez 
v. NYLS opinion, which the Austin court recognized as binding precedent. See Austin v. 
Albany Law Sch. of Union Univ., 2013 WL 45884 at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Gomez-
Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 2012 WL 6620602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
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School,138 Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University,139 Florida 
Coastal Law School,140 Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of 
Law,141 DePaul University College of Law,142 The John Marshall Law School,143 
California Western School of Law,144 Southwestern Law School,145 Golden Gate 
University School of Law,146 University of San Francisco School of Law,147 and 
Widener University School of Law.148 According to Anziska and Strauss, they 
targeted these specific schools “either because alumni or students approached them 
with concerns, or because the postgraduate job data they have reported to the 
American Bar Association were ‘implausible.’”149 
As the February 2012 round of lawsuits illustrates, law schools that are private, 
expensive, and poorly ranked are particularly likely to be targeted for class-action 
lawsuits because alumni of such schools are particularly likely to be dissatisfied 
with the economic value of their legal education.150 Nevertheless, more highly 
ranked law schools are not necessarily immune to this type of litigation.151 On 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. Amended Class Action Complaint, Bevelacqua v. Brooklyn Law Sch., No. 
500175/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 17, 2012), ECF No. 18 (originally filed Feb. 1, 2012). 
 139. Class Action Complaint, Richins v. Hofstra Univ., No. 12-cv-01110 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
6, 2012), removed from No. 600138 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012). 
 140. Complaint, Casey v. Florida Coastal Sch. of Law, Inc., No. 12-cv-20785-MGC 
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2012), removed from No. 12-03990-CA-40 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012). 
 141. Class Action Complaint, Evans v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., No. 12-CH-03522 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. Feb. 1, 2012). 
 142. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Phillips v. DePaul Univ., No. 12-cv-1791 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2012), ECF No. 16, removed from No. 12-CH-03523 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 
2012). This case was eventually remanded back to the state court, see Memorandum Order, 
Phillips v. DePaul Univ., No. 12-cv-1791 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 19, which 
ultimately dismissed the lawsuit for reasons similar to those discussed in the dismissals of 
the Cooley and NYLS cases. Compare Memorandum and Order, Phillips v. DePaul Univ., 
No. 12-CH-03523 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 11, 2012), with infra notes 170−205 and accompanying 
text. 
 143. Class Action Complaint, Johnson v. John Marshall Law Sch., No. 12-CH-03494 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012). 
 144. Class Action Complaint, Chaves v. Cal. W. Sch. of Law, No. 37-2012-D0091627-
CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012). 
 145. Class Action Complaint, Derby v. Sw. Law Sch., No. BC478133 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 1, 2012). 
 146. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Arring v. Golden Gate Univ., No. CGC-12-
517837 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 4, 2012) (originally filed Feb. 1, 2012). 
 147. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Hallock v. Univ. S.F., No. CGC-12-517861 
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 4, 2012) (originally filed Feb. 1, 2012). 
 148. Amended Class Action Complaint, Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law, No. 12-
cv-608 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2012), ECF No. 8 (originally filed Feb. 1, 2012). 
 149. Sloan, supra note 134. 
 150. See Breaking: Class Action Suit Filed Against Thomas Jefferson School of Law, L. 
SCH. TRANSPARENCY (May 27, 2011, 3:01 AM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/
2011/05/breaking-class-action-suit-filed-against-thomas-jefferson-school-of-law/. 
 151. See Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11 n.5, MacDonald v. 
Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-831 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2011), ECF No. 37 
(“Because most law schools report deceptive and misleading employment data, almost every 
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March 14, 2012, Anziska and Strauss announced plans to sue an additional twenty 
law schools in ten states, including two top-50 schools and eight top-100 schools.152 
While the attorneys failed to sue any of the schools by Memorial Day 2012, as was 
their stated goal,153 the announcement raises the possibility that additional lawsuits 
against these or other law schools may be forthcoming. 
3. Early Opinions on the Lawsuits 
Of course, whether or not additional lawsuits will be forthcoming may depend in 
no small part on how the first fifteen lawsuits are resolved. While it is impossible to 
predict whether any of the pending cases will ultimately result in a judgment or 
settlement, early rulings indicate that at least some of the cases have a chance of 
avoiding summary disposition. In March 2012, the judge hearing the case against 
TJSL informed the law school that its demurrer “was not well-taken,”154 and in July 
2012, the judge hearing the cases against Golden Gate University School of Law 
and San Francisco University School of Law overruled the demurrers the two 
schools had filed in their respective lawsuits.155  
                                                                                                                 
law school in the nation is vulnerable to a suit such as this.”). 
 152. See Karen Sloan, Plaintiffs’ Firms Target Another 20 Law Schools, Alleging Fraud, 
NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=12025455
75181&Graduates_target_another_law_schools_alleging_fraud&slreturn=20120719142504. 
The following law schools were those targeted for lawsuits by the announcement: American 
University Washington College of Law; Catholic University of America Columbus School 
of Law; Chapman University School of Law; Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law; University of Miami School of Law; New England 
School of Law; Pace Law School; Pepperdine University School of Law; Roger Williams 
University School of Law; Saint Louis University School of Law; St. John’s University 
School of Law; St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami; Seattle University School of 
Law; Stetson University College of Law; Syracuse University College of Law; Valparaiso 
University School of Law; Western New England University School of Law; Whittier Law 
School; and Yeshiva University Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. See Staci Zaretsky, Breaking: Thomas Jefferson School of Law's Motion to Dismiss 
DENIEDAnd Twenty More Law Schools to Be Sued, ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 14, 2012, 2:42 
PM), http://www.abovethelaw.com/2012/03/twenty-more-law-schools-targeted-for-class-action-
lawsuits/ (quoting Brian Procel, attorney for plaintiff Anna Alaburda). After the case entered 
into discovery, a former Assistant Director at TJSL’s Career Services Office came forward 
alleging that her supervisors instructed her to use various methods to artificially inflate 
TJSL’s employment statistics. See Declaration of Karen Grant, Alaburda v. Thomas 
Jefferson Sch. of Law, No. 37-2011-00091898-CU-FR-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012). 
If these allegations are true, “TJSL could face sanctions from the American Bar Association 
as severe as losing accreditation.” Breaking: Ex-CSO Assistant Director from Thomas 
Jefferson Admits to Fraud, Alleges Deliberate Scheme by Law School, L. SCH. 
TRANSPARENCY (Oct. 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2012/
10/ex-cso-assistant-director-from-tjls-admits-to-fraud/. For its part, TJSL has officially 
denied the allegations. Litigation Update, T. JEFFERSON SCH. L. (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.tjsl.edu/news-media/2012/7835. 
 155. Order Overruling Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, Arring v. Golden Gate 
Univ., No. CGC-12-517837 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2012) [hereinafter Order Overruling 
Golden Gate’s Demurrer]; Order Overruling Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, 
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On the other hand, the judges hearing the cases against NYLS and Cooley have 
granted motions dismissing those two lawsuits.156 While obviously disappointing to 
the plaintiffs and attorneys involved in the lawsuits, the decision did not exactly 
come as a surprise. At least according to a statement Anziska and Strauss issued 
after the case against NYLS had been dismissed, the attorneys “always expected 
for many of [the] issues to ultimately be resolved on an appellate level.”157 To that 
end, the two have already filed appeals of both the NYLS and Cooley decisions 
with the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division and the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, respectively.158 The New York Supreme Court’s Appellate 
Division has already affirmed the lower-court’s decision to dismiss the lawsuit 
against NYLS,159 but other appellate courts might be more sympathetic to the 
plaintiffs’ claims than some of the trial courts were initially. 
B. Precedent for the Lawsuits 
Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson School of Law was a groundbreaking case, but 
there is some precedent for this type of litigation.160 For example, the California 
Culinary Academy (CCA) recently agreed to pay $40 million to settle class-action 
lawsuits brought by graduates who accused the school of exaggerating its 
employment rates, prestige, and selectivity.161 Per the terms of a consolidated 
                                                                                                                 
Hallock v. Univ. S.F., No. CGC-12-517861 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2012) [hereinafter 
Order Overruling Univ. S.F.’s Demurrer]. 
 156. See MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-831, 2012 WL 
2994107 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012); Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). The lawsuit against DePaul University has also been dismissed. See 
supra note 142. 
 157. Staci Zaretsky, Breaking: Class Action Lawsuit Against New York Law School 
Dismissed, ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 21, 2012 12:12 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/03/
breaking-class-action-lawsuit-against-new-york-law-school-dismissed/. Of course, given the 
procedural posture of the cases, the plaintiffs could win at the appellate level but ultimately 
lose on remand, so success at the appellate level is necessary but not by itself sufficient for 
the plaintiffs to succeed in their claims. 
 158. Notice of Appeal, Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 2012 WL 2994107, ECF No. 57; 
Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 2012 WL 6620602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). Although the 
New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division ultimately affirmed the lower court’s order 
dismissing the lawsuit against NYLS, the court was “not unsympathetic to [the] plaintiffs’ 
concerns.” Id. at *4. The court recognized that students “sometimes make decisions to yoke 
themselves and their spouses and/or their children to a crushing burden because the schools 
have made misleading representations that give the impression that a full time job is easily 
obtainable when in fact it is not.” Id. In light of “this reality” and the “high ethical standards” 
that are a source of pride to the legal profession, the court stated that NYLS and its peers 
“owe prospective students more than just barebones compliance with their legal obligations 
[and] . . . have at least an ethical obligation of absolute candor to their prospective students.” 
Id. 
 159. Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 2012 WL 6620602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
 160. See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the For-
Profit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 538−40 (2012); Joseph Sipley, Note, 
For-Profit Education and Federal Funding: Bad Outcomes for Students and Taxpayers, 64 
RUTGERS L. REV. 267, 287−88 (2011). 
 161. See Order Regarding Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Class 
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settlement, which was given final approval in April 2012 by the San Francisco 
Superior Court,162 the 8500 class members are each potentially eligible to receive 
thousands of dollars in tuition rebates.163 CCA also agreed to change its recruiting 
practices and improve its disclosures to prospective students, although the 
settlement did not require CCA or its publicly-traded parent company, Career 
Education Corporation (“Career Education”), to admit to any wrongdoing.164 
According to a Career Education spokesman, the company agreed to settle the 
lawsuits because “they were too expensive to litigate and distracting to 
employees.”165 
Unsurprisingly, the success of the CCA case has helped generate interest for 
additional class-actions against for-profit institutions of higher education.166 While 
there may be important factual and legal differences between the CCA case and the 
law school lawsuits, the CCA case provides a model for how a settlement between 
a law school and its graduates might be structured. It should also make some law 
school administratorsparticularly those at law schools based in 
Californiasomewhat nervous about the prospect of having to defend a similar 
lawsuit. 
Of course, the most obviously relevant precedent for the law school lawsuits is 
the law school lawsuits themselves. Unsurprisingly, law school defendants have 
been quick to offer the orders dismissing the NYLS and Cooley cases as 
supplemental authority supporting their own motions to dismiss.167 However, 
because the cases raise claims that sound in state law, which will necessarily vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, these early cases will not be directly precedential 
to many subsequent cases.168 Certainly, judges in subsequent lawsuits may look to 
these two cases for persuasive authority on some of the issues raised in the 
                                                                                                                 
Notice, Ex. 1, at 6−7, Amador v. California Culinary Acad., No. CGC-07-467710 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2011). 
 162. See Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Granting 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs at 3, Amador v. California Culinary Acad., 
No. CGC-07-467710 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2011). 
 163. See Order Regarding Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Class 
Notice, Ex. 1, at 9−11, California Culinary Acad., No. CGC-07-467710. 
 164. See id. Ex. 1, at 9. 
 165. Terence Chea, Culinary Schools Grads Claim They Were Ripped Off, 
NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 4, 2011, 5:35 PM), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44393771/ns/us_news-
life/t/culinary-school-grads-claim-they-were-ripped/%20#.UDEYSqkpMWF. 
 166. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Kimble v. Rhodes Coll., No. 3:10-cv-05786-
EMC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (a purported class action brought on behalf of graduates of 
Everest College alleging, among other things, that the college misrepresented its job 
placement rates to prospective students). 
 167. See, e.g., Notice of Filing Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint, Casey v. Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-20785-MGC (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 22, 2012), ECF No. 10 (offering a copy of the order dismissing the NYLS case). 
 168. See Peter Lattman, 9 Graduates Lose Case Against New York Law School, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 22, 2012, 7:59 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/9-
graduates-lose-case-against-new-york-law-school/?ref=business. Perhaps for this reason, the 
order dismissing the lawsuit against DePaul University does not even cite the NYLS and 
Cooley cases. See Memorandum and Order, Phillips v. DePaul Univ., No. 12-CH-03523 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Sept. 11, 2012). 
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lawsuits, but the mere fact that some of the purported class-action lawsuits against 
law schools have been dismissed does not mean that defendants in subsequent 
lawsuits will not still have to vigorously defend themselves.169 
C. Some Possible Objections to the Lawsuits 
Because each of these class-action lawsuits raise claims that sound in state law, 
and because law schools in many different states have now been targeted for 
lawsuits,170 it is not feasible (within the space provided for this Note) to analyze the 
merits of all of the various claims and defenses parties litigating such lawsuits 
might raise. However, the plaintiffs in each of the lawsuits accuse their alma maters 
of the same basic wrongdoing, so this Part describes a fewbut by no means 
allpotential objections one might raise against any of the lawsuits. While 
plaintiffs in these lawsuits could also lose on more technical grounds,171 they will 
certainly need to convince the courts to side with them on each of these potential 
objections if their claims are to ultimately succeed. 
1. Have ABA Reforms Rendered the Lawsuit Moot? 
When the ABA was doing nothing about the law school transparency problem 
and individual law schoolswith the ABA’s blessingwere offering prospective 
students employment statistics that were “so vague and incomplete as to be 
meaningless,”172 class-action lawsuits against individual law schools were seen by 
some as a potential way to solve the law school transparency problem.173 However, 
in light of recent ABA reforms, which may have been motivated in part by the 
lawsuits themselves,174 the idea of using the lawsuits as a vehicle for social change 
may have lost some of its appeal. Nevertheless, the ABA has not yet completely 
solved the law school transparency problem,175 so the lawsuits may still have a role 
to play in helping solve that problem. 
This is particularly true as it relates to a problem the ABA is currently 
ignoringthe fact that law school employment statistics are currently based on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. However, if many additional cases are summarily dismissed, it is less likely that 
potential plaintiffs would file similar suits in the future. Additionally, those cases that 
ultimately result an appellate decision will create precedent that will be binding upon courts 
within that jurisdiction hearing similar lawsuits. See, e.g., Austin v. Albany Law Sch. of 
Union Univ., 2013 WL 45884 at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (recognizing Gomez-Jimenez v. 
N.Y. Law Sch., 2012 WL 6620602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) as binding precedent). 
 170. See supra notes 103−48 and accompanying text. 
 171. See, e.g., Opinion Granting Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, MacDonald v. Thomas 
M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-831, 2012 WL 2994107 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012) 
(holding that the Complaint does not allege a claim under the Michigan Consumer Protection 
Act because the plaintiffs purchased Cooley’s legal education “primarily for [a] business or 
commercial [purpose]”). 
 172. Opinion Granting Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss at *11, Thomas M. Cooley Law Schl., 
2012 WL 2994107. 
 173. See, e.g., Class Actions as a Tool of Social Change, supra note 122. 
 174. See Sloan, supra note 134. 
 175. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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unaudited reports compiled by the law schools themselves. In an early interview 
regarding the lawsuits, David Anziska said: 
[A]ll law schools must have their employment data audited. There can 
be no more self-reporting of unaudited employment data released to the 
public. Over my dead body, this has to happen, because the incentive to 
cheat is too great. All law schools must be forced to have their 
employment data independently verified. I will not sign off on an 
agreement that does not have that in it. Period. It will not happen.176 
Although attorneys working on other cases may feel differently about the relative 
importance of requiring law schools to have their employment data independently 
verified, Anziska’s comments indicate that increased transparency will likely be a 
component of any settlement agreement between law schools and their alumni, at 
least as long as law school transparency remains a problem. 
Additionally, the ABA reforms are necessarily forward looking. The ABA is not 
going to create an ex post facto rule that punishes law schools for making 
statements that actually complied with the ABA’s previous (inadequate) reporting 
requirements. However, state courts can punish law schools for making those same 
statements if they were made in violation of state law.177 Thus, unlike ABA 
reforms, class-action litigation has the potential to punish law schools for their prior 
bad acts and to compensate plaintiffs who may have been injured by those bad acts, 
making it a potentially useful supplement to ABA reforms in this area. 
2. Are the ABA and NALP Necessary Parties to the Lawsuits? 
Given that Anziska and Strauss ultimately wish to “force a global settlement 
through the ABA,”178 why did they not sue the ABA to begin with? They say it is 
because the plaintiffs paid their tuition money to the law schools, not the ABA, and 
because the attorneys wanted to initially “hit the primary tortfeasors and bad 
actors.”179 Nevertheless, defendants in some of the lawsuits have argued that 
because the plaintiffs seek a system-wide remedy, the ABA and NALP are 
necessary parties to the lawsuits.180 
While it is certainly understandable why defendants would make this argument, 
it is not a particularly convincing one. Even Judge Quist, who ultimately granted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Staci Zaretsky, Fifteen More Law Schools to Be Hit with Class Action Lawsuits 
Over Post-Grad Employment Rates, ABOVE THE L. (Oct. 5, 2011, 2:50 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/10/fifteen-more-law-schools-to-be-hit-with-class-action-
lawsuits-over-post-grad-employment-rates/ (emphasis in original) (quoting David Anziska). 
 177. See Order Regarding Rulings At Oral Argument at 3, MacDonald v. Thomas M. 
Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-831 (W.D. Mich. June 7, 2012), ECF No. 51 (“Neither field 
preemption nor express preemption prevents Plaintiffs from raising their claims, all of which 
are based on state law.”). 
 178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 179. Zaretsky, supra note 136 (quoting David Anziska). 
 180. See Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 6−7. 
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Cooley’s motion to dismiss,181 disagreed with Cooley on this particular issue, 
explaining:  
Even though Plaintiff’s goal may be to fix systemic problems in law 
school employment data reporting, that goal is not what they seek to 
accomplish with this particular lawsuit. Plaintiffs seek damages and 
equitable relief solely from Cooley and its agents. . . . Along with 
damages, Plaintiffs seek an injunction that would require Cooley to 
report more accurate employment data. The ABA’s and NALP’s 
standards are a floor, not a ceiling. Cooley could provide prospective 
and current students with data that contains more information than the 
employment statistics required by the ABA and NALP, while at the 
same time complying with the ABA’s and NALP’s requirements.182 
Even though the plaintiffs’ attorneys who brought the lawsuits did so as part of 
their plan to sue enough schools to force a “global settlement through the ABA,”183 
none of the lawsuits request relief from the ABA or NALP. Thus, there is no 
apparent reason to believe that either organization should be considered a necessary 
party to any of the lawsuits. 
3. Did the Law Schools Actually Make Any False Statements? 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the law school lawsuits is the fact that many 
of the representations of which the plaintiffs complain were not objectively false. 
For example, although it is probably true that the “percentage of graduates 
employed” statistics law schools provided to prospective students were somewhat 
misleading (because they did not differentiate between part-time, full-time, legal, 
and nonlegal jobs), even the plaintiffs in these lawsuits must acknowledge that the 
defendants never actually claimed that their “percentage of graduates employed” 
statistics only counted full-time legal jobs.184 Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs might 
have been misled by the statistics, it is because the plaintiffs themselves 
misinterpreted the statistics, not because the statistics were factually inaccurate.185 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the context in which the allegedly 
fraudulent employment statistics were disclosed (i.e. in materials designed to attract 
and retain students) implied that the employment statistics referred to “jobs for 
which a [legal] education is [required or preferred] and . . . not . . . for which a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. See Opinion Granting Cooley’s Motion to Dismiss, MacDonald v. Thomas M. 
Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-831, 2012 WL 2994107 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012). 
 182. Order Regarding Rulings At Oral Argument at 2, Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 
1:11-cv-831, ECF No. 51 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The phrase “[t]he ABA’s 
and NALP’s standards are a floor, not a ceiling” was subsequently stricken from the opinion 
at Cooley’s request, see Order, MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-cv-
831 (W.D. Mich. June 20, 2012), ECF No. 53, but the sentiment and reasoning of the 
opinion still imply as much.  
 183. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 184. See MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 11-cv-831, 2012 WL 
2994107, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 20, 2012). 
 185. See id. 
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[legal] education is irrelevant or of minimal utility.”186 According to this view, 
which Judge Kahn acknowledged in his orders overruling the University of San 
Francisco School of Law (“San Francisco”) and Golden Gate University School of 
Law (“Golden Gate”) demurrers,187 that the employment statistics might be 
factually accurate “is ‘truthiness’ in the technical sense that lawyers are infamous 
for, but [not] honest.”188 Thus, even though the plaintiffs in these lawsuits have 
been unable to produce any evidence that the law schools published employment 
statistics that were factually untrue, Judge Khan’s orders suggest that summary 
disposition of the lawsuits might be inappropriate. 
4. Did the Plaintiffs Reasonably Rely on Any False Statements? 
While reasonable minds might disagree about whether or not prospective law 
students are sophisticated consumers,189 the plaintiffs in these lawsuits might have a 
difficult time demonstrating that they reasonably relied on any fraudulent 
statements made by the defendants. For example, the Cooley plaintiffs claimed 
“Cooley’s statistics are at odds with the employment statistics reported by NALP 
because, despite Cooley’s lenient admission standards and bottom-tier ranking, 
Cooley’s statistics suggest that it had a higher placement rate than 40% of the 
nation’s law schools.”190 However, because such “basic deductive reasoning” 
provides a reason to question Cooley’s published employment statistics, Cooley 
was able to arguesuccessfullythat the plaintiffs could not have reasonably 
relied on those employment statistics.191 
Similarly, many of the law schools “advertised employment rates that exceeded 
their bar pass rates, which implies that not all the jobs were lawyer jobs.”192 
Because bar admission is a prerequisite to practice law, some of the defendants 
have argued that “any reasonable reader would immediately recognize” that the 
“employed nine months after graduation” statistic must include non-lawyer 
positions.193 Although it seems questionable whether any reasonable reader would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. Order Overruling Golden Gate’s Demurrer, supra note 155, at 2. 
 187. Id.; Order Overruling Univ. S.F.’s Demurrer, supra note 155, at 2. To be clear, 
Judge Kahn refused to grant the defendants demurrers because he recognized this possibility, 
not because he endorsed it himself at that time. Id. 
 188. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 74. 
 189. Compare Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2012) (“By anyone’s definition, reasonable consumers—college graduates—seriously 
considering law schools are a sophisticated subset of education consumers, capable of sifting 
through data and weighing alternatives before making a decision regarding their post-college 
options, such as applying for professional school.”), with Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 2012 
WL 2994107, at *10 (“This Court does not necessarily agree that college graduates are 
particularly sophisticated in making career or business decisions. Sometimes hope and 
dreams triumph over experience and common sense.”). 
 190. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 2012 WL 2994107, at *2. 
 191. Id. at *6. 
 192. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 74. 
 193. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Thomas Jefferson 
School of Law’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 2, Alaburda v. Thomas 
Jefferson Sch. of Law, No. 37-2011-00091898-CU-FR-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. July 18, 2011) 
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have immediately put two and two together, it cannot be denied that “[s]keptical 
prospective students who conducted a diligent investigation into the employment 
numbers would have realized that something didn’t add up.”194 
These arguments managed to convince the judges hearing the NYLS and Cooley 
cases that the plaintiffs in those cases could not have reasonably relied on any 
misrepresentations the defendants may have made, but Judge Kahn explicitly 
rejected such arguments in overruling demurrers filed in the above-mentioned San 
Francisco and Golden Gate cases.195 After noting that “California case law 
establishes that ordinarily the issue of whether a statement is likely to deceive a 
reasonable consumer is a question of fact,” the judge held that the issue of whether 
the employment statistics would have misled reasonable consumers was “simply 
not amenable to resolution on a demurrer and must await factual development by 
the parties.”196 Thus, even if the fraud claims made by the plaintiffs’ in the various 
law school lawsuits ultimately fail due to the unreasonableness of any reliance on 
their part, the cases may nevertheless avoid summary disposition. On the other 
hand, the need for “factual development by the parties” might also provide the 
defendants with a basis for arguing that the lawsuits should not be certified as class 
actions or coordinated with related lawsuits.197 
5. Are the Damages the Plaintiffs Allege Too Remote and/or Speculative? 
Even if the plaintiffs in the lawsuits could establish that the law schools made 
fraudulent statements regarding their employment rates and that the plaintiffs 
reasonably relied on those fraudulent statements when deciding to enroll and 
remain enrolled at those law schools, the plaintiffs may have a difficult time 
establishing exactly how they were injured by those fraudulent statements. For 
example, after struggling for about a year to find work despite sending out “tens” of 
resumes, Alexandra Gomez-Jimenez (one of the named plaintiffs in the case against 
NYLS) eventually secured a full-time legal position and now has a “thriving” 
immigration practice at her own firm in Manhattan.198 Consequently, one could 
debate whether Ms. Gomez-Jimenez has been injured at all. For someone who went 
to the eighth-best law school199 in the most saturated legal employment market in 
                                                                                                                 
(citation omitted). 
 194. TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 74. 
 195. See Order Overruling Golden Gate’s Demurrer, supra note 155, at 2; Order 
Overruling Univ. S.F.’s Demurrer, supra note 155, at 2. 
 196. Order Overruling Golden Gate’s Demurrer, supra note 155, at 2; Order Overruling 
Univ. S.F.’s Demurrer, supra note 155, at 2. 
 197. See, e.g., Case Management Statement, Attachment, at 1, Arring v. Golden Gate 
Univ., No. CGC-12-517837 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 21, 2012) (“[A]s individual issues of fact 
and law predominate over any common issues, Plaintiffs’ claims are inappropriate for class 
treatment.”); id. at 4 (“[Golden Gate] will oppose Plaintiffs’ Petition [to Coordinate] as there 
is no reason to coordinate these matters. There are four separate groups of plaintiffs alleging 
separate and independent harm against four unrelated law schools. There is no overlap of 
facts or witnesses in the cases, and they should each be litigated in their respective forums.”). 
 198. See NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, at 8–9. 
 199. Based on the current U.S. News rankings of the New York City area law schools, 
that is. See Best Law Schools: New York Law Schools, supra note 130. 
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the country200 and still managed to find a job in a terrible entry-level legal 
employment market201 despite not being particularly aggressive in her job search, 
she seems to have done pretty well for herself. To be sure, some of the named 
plaintiffs in the lawsuits are more sympathetic figures than Ms. Gomez-Jimenez,202 
but some of the plaintiffs may not seem particularly deserving of damages at all. 
To avoid this problem, the plaintiffs suggest that the correct measure of their 
damages is the “difference between a degree where a high-paying, full-time, 
permanent job was highly likely and a degree where full-time permanent legal 
employment at any salary, let alone a high salary, is scarce.”203 While such a 
valuation may be inherently speculative,204 using it is especially problematic in 
light of the fact that most of the named plaintiffs in the lawsuits graduated during or 
immediately after the Great Recession, which decimated the entry-level legal 
employment market.205 Thus, even if the law schools had not made any 
misrepresentations regarding their employment statistics, many of these students 
likely would have been disappointed with the bleak employment prospects awaiting 
them at graduation.206  
For these reasons, Judge Melvin Schweitzer, the judge hearing the case against 
NYLS declined to “engage in [the] naked speculation” required to adopt the 
plaintiff’s proposed measure of damages.207 Although it is certainly possible that 
other judges will disagree with Judge Schweitzer’s opinion that the damages 
alleged by plaintiffs in similar lawsuits are too remote and speculative to justify 
relief, Judge Schwitzer’s opinion does “exemplify the adage that not every ailment 
afflicting society may be redressed by a lawsuit.”208 It also suggests that plaintiffs 
in other lawsuits may want to try to offer a more concrete method for valuating 
their damages. Otherwise, there is a good chance that other judges will look to 
Judge Schwitzer’s opinion as persuasive authority on this issue.209 
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE LAWSUITS ON THE LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY PROBLEM 
The most obvious result these cases have had is to increase interest in this type 
of litigation, as the relatively quick proliferation of these lawsuits demonstrates. If 
just one of the early cases is able to avoid summary disposition, the specter of such 
litigation would become a very real threat to other vulnerable law schools, and one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. See Rampell, supra note 7. 
 201. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 202. For example, despite passing the New York Bar Exam and graduating in the top-
15% of her class, Chloe Gilgan had to work as a saleswoman at a department store while she 
was unable to find legal employment for fourteen months. She then found work as a legal 
secretary, but does not currently work as an attorney. See NYLS Complaint, supra note 32, 
at 16–17. 
 203. See Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 204. See id. at 850. 
 205. See id. at 851. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 854. 
 209. See supra notes 167−69 and accompanying text. 
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would expect interest in additional litigation against law schools to increase 
significantly.210 Because law school administrators would obviously like to avoid 
having their schools literally put on trial, the lawsuits could provide law schools 
with a powerful incentive to increase transparency voluntarily. True, elite and state-
run law schools may not have as much reason to fear being sued by dissatisfied 
alumni as lower-ranked and for-profit law schools do, but the lawsuits have 
probably contributed to some law schools’ decisions to heed the calls for increased 
transparency. 
Even if a law school need not fear a lawsuit, the lawsuits have demonstrated that 
there is a strong demand for better information about the employment outcomes of 
recent law school graduates. Like the New York Times articles by David Segal and 
the advocacy efforts of Law School Transparency, the lawsuits have helped raise 
awareness among prospective law students about the declining value proposition of 
attending law school, especially the value proposition of attending the law schools 
that have been sued or targeted for lawsuits.211 It is now virtually impossible for 
prospective law students who do any amount of research about these law schools to 
avoid stumbling upon information about the lawsuits,212 and if the knowledge that 
dissatisfied graduates have sued a particular law school because of their bleak 
employment prospects does not make prospective students think twice about 
borrowing tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars to attend that school, what will?  
Because the lawsuits have tarnished the reputations of the schools that have 
been targeted by lawsuits, the lawsuits may have a negative effect on the financial 
stability of those schools. For example, in January 2012, Moody’s Investors 
Service revised its outlook for NYLS from “stable” to “negative,” citing “recent 
enrollment volatility and uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a recent lawsuit 
and its potential impact on the school’s market position and longer-term student 
demand.”213 The following month, Moody’s issued a report characterizing such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 528 
(2007). 
 211. For example, due to declining interest from prospective students, Cooley’s 2011 
entering class was almost 27% smaller than its entering class the previous year, while its 
2012 class was about 15% smaller than its 2011 class. See Matthew Miller, Cooley Law 
Enrollment Falls Amid Skepticism, LANSING ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2012, 12:59 AM), http://www.
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enrollment-falls-amid-skepticism?nclick_check=1.  
 212. For example, a Google search for the phrase “Thomas Jefferson School of Law” 
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Law School Files Motion to Dismiss Lawsuit, N.Y. L. SCH. (Oct. 13, 2011), 
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prospective law students who receive all of their information about the schools from the 
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 213. Faiza Mawjee, Moody’s Affirms A3 Underlying Rating on New York Law School’s 
Series 2006A, B-1 and B-2 Bonds; Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable, MOODY’S 
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lawsuits as “credit negative.”214 Moody’s, which “maintains credit ratings for eight 
of the fifteen schools that had been sued” as of February 2012, noted that 
“standalone” law schools “are more likely to suffer negative effects from the 
lawsuits than [are law schools] that are a part of . . . larger universit[ies].215 
Interestingly, even though the lawsuit against NYLS has been dismissed, Moody’s 
has not been quick to revise its outlook for the law school.216 Despite NYLS’s 
victory in court, it is too early to tell what impact the negative publicity generated 
by the lawsuits have had on longer-term student demand. Thus, even if other 
schools succeed in having the cases that have been filed against them dismissed 
relatively quickly, the reputational harm inflicted by the lawsuits may far outlast 
the lawsuits themselves. 
Perhaps the most important effect the lawsuits have had is to convince the ABA 
and law schools to take the law school transparency movement seriously.217 Anna 
Alaburda’s groundbreaking lawsuit preceded both recent ABA reforms218 and 
decision of many law schools to voluntarily disclose their NALP data.219 Of course, 
the lawsuit was filed during a time in which the legal education industry was being 
heavily criticized by mainstream media220 and several U.S. Senators.221 No doubt 
this criticism also played a role in helping convince the ABA and individual law 
schools to do something about the law school transparency problem. However, the 
prospect of additional litigation certainly gave legal educators a strong incentive to 
take steps towards solving the law school transparency problem sooner rather than 
later.  
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CONCLUSION 
Whether or not law schools are to blame for the precarious financial position in 
which many recent law school graduates find themselves, it is getting harder and 
harder to deny that the value proposition of attending law school has declined 
significantly in recent years.222 Prospective students now have more information 
than ever to use in deciding whether attending a particular law school is a good 
choice for them, yet law schools could certainly do more to ensure that prospective 
students are fully informed about the costs and risks of investing in a legal 
education. Given the high cost of pursuing a legal education today, it is particularly 
important that prospective law students have access to reliable, school-specific 
information about the salaries earned by recent graduates.  
Some law schools have started to voluntarily provide more comprehensive and 
reliable employment statistics, but many law schools are unlikely to follow their 
lead unless they are pressured to do so. One potential source of such pressure is the 
specter of class-action lawsuits. Even if such lawsuits are unlikely to result in large 
awards for plaintiffs, defending such lawsuits can be expensive, and will 
necessarily tarnish a law school’s reputation. This will in turn hinder the law 
school’s ability to attract new students, and may even endanger the law school’s 
financial stability.  
Furthermore, unlike exclusively forward-looking methods for resolving the law 
school transparency problem, class-action lawsuits can also be used to punish law 
schools for their prior bad acts and to compensate the victims of those acts. Thus, 
even if the ABA takes immediate, sweeping action in response to calls for 
additional reforms to the way law schools report their employment statistics, the 
threat many law schools face from this new type of class-action litigation will not 
dissipate entirely until any applicable statutes of limitation run their courses. While 
the likelihood of future lawsuits will depend in no small part on how early cases are 
resolved, law school administrators would be wise to take immediate preventative 
measures to make sure their schools are not targeted for lawsuits next. If a small 
decline in a law school’s U.S. News ranking is enough to send the school into a 
“death spiral of rapidly departing employers, students and faculty,”223 what effect 
might the prospect—even the faint prospect—of being forced to settle an eight 
figure lawsuit have on the future of a law school? 
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